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On what then did the court in the principal case base its decision? The court
mentioned nothing about the reasonableness of the officer's actions at the time of
the search. It also mentioned nothing about whether the second search was executed
under a void warrant. It stated merely that such a search was an unreasonable search
and seizure in itself, regardless of the surrounding facts. It therefore may be assumed
that the court decided the issue presented on the basis of general policy as the courts
do with regard to invalid warrants; thus putting a general limitation on the power of
officers to make second searches regardless of what reason such officers may have for
so doing.
Herbert Kessler.
PROPERTY: RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION.-A prohibition in a grant of real
property that the land shall not be transferred was declared void in a recent California
case." The title in fee simple to the property had been vested in William S. Hart by
mesne conveyances from the original owner, who had acquired the property in 1839
by grant from the Provisional Governor of the Department of California, then part
of the Republic of Mexico. This grant provided in part: "Neither the grantee nor
his heirs shall divide or transfer that which is adjudicated to him, or impose upon it
ground rents, entailment, surety, mortgage or any other encumbrances even for a
pious cause or transfer it in mortmain."
William S. Hart died in June, 1946, devising said real property to the County
of Los Angeles upon condition that the property shall be forever used and maintained
by the county as a public park. Decedent's son sought a judgment declaring that this
provision in his father's will was prohibited by the clause restraining alienation in
the original grant, and therefore void. The son also sought a judgment declaring that
the title to said property was now vested in him as sole heir. Neither judgment was
granted.
Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 2 whereby all property now comprising
the State of California was ceded to the United States by the Republic of Mexico, the
United States was obligated to respect and protect the land titles of persons who then
owned land in the conquered territory. The court held that any question as to the
title of property, acquired prior to the conquest of California by the United States,
was to be determined by reference to Mexican law. Such a determination had been
made in 1875, when in accordance with "An Act to Ascertain and Settle the Private
Land Claims in the State of California," 3 a confirmatory patent had been issued by
the government of the United States to the heirs of the original grantee. The court,
in the principal case, further held that any question as to the validity of restraints
or restrictions placed upon the property, acquired prior to the conquest, was, under
the decision in Fremont v. United States, 4 to be determined according to American
law.
The District Court of Appeals then held the clause restraining alienation in the
original grant to be a condition subsequent and void under section 711 of the California Civil Code, which provides that, "Conditions restraining alienation, when
repugnant to the interest created, are void." The court, having held the restriction
to be a condition subsequent, had no alternative but to rule the condition void, in view
of the concise and forceful language of section 711. The result of the decision was both
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correct and desirable. But the same result could have been reached by the court if it
had simply held the clause restraining alienation to be a mere disabling restraint and
therefore unenforceable. 5
The distinction between a condition subsequent and a disabling restraint is that
in the former a power is retained by the conveyor or his successor in interest to enter
and terminate the estate granted upon the occurrence of a stated event, 6 while a
attempt by an otherwise effective conveyance to cause a later
disabling restraint is an
7
conveyance to be void.
Is there any form of limitation by which a grantor of an estate in fee can prevent
its alienation as the original grantor here attempted to do? Suppose that the grantor
had used the specific language necessary to create a fee simple upon condition subsequent: 8 "I hereby grant Blackacre to B and his heirs upon the express condition that
it not be sold or transferred, and if it be sold or transferred, the grantor, his heirs or
assigns shall have the right to re-enter and terminate the grantee's estate." Or suppose
that the grantor had used the specific language necessary to create a fee simple determinable:9 "I hereby grant Blackacre to B and his heirs so long as it is not sold or
transferred and if it be sold or transferred, Blackacre shall immediately revert to the
grantor, his heirs or assigns." The restrictions in both of these limitations would be
void as any absolute restraint on the alienation of an estate in fee simple is invalid if
such estate would be indefeasible but for such restraint.' 0
Theoretically neither of the above limitations falls squarely within the provisions
of Civil Code Section 711, which by its terms applies only to "conditions restraining
alienation, when repugnant to the interest created." Such conditions are not repugnant to, but are integral parts of, the estate granted."
If repugnancy were the reason for holding conditions restraining alienation void,
then logically section 711 should apply with equal force to such conditions when
attached to grants of all types of estates, whether in fee, for life or for years. But
life estates or estates for years, either legal or equitable, in real or personal property,
may be created subject to conditions against alienation, and have been held valid and
enforceable.' 2
Logically, a more sound basis on which to rest the California decisions and the
interpretation of Civil Code Section 711 is public policy and convenience to facilitate
the exchange of property, to simplify the incidents attached to its ownership and to
free it from restrictions which are not only injurious to the possessor, but to the
public at large. 13
The principal case is another illustration of the fact that under the existing public
policy as manifested by the laws of property there is no way in which a valid unqualified
restraint on alienation can be imposed on an estate in fee.
ARTHUR M.

SCHAFFER.
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